Research
Journal Articles
Vall-Prat, P. (2022) Economic Shocks, Mobilization, and Regional Elite Splits. Comparative Political Studies, 56(2), 193–227. . DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221089641 [Paper] [Replication materials]
Vall-Prat, P. (2021) Dataset of Historical Electoral Results in Catalonia (DHEC): Micro-Level Historical Results (1890–1923). Data in Brief. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2021.107017 [Original dataset]
Rodon, T. & Vall-Prat, P. (2018) Designing a regional cabinet: How the economic context, political fragmentation and polarization shape cabinet size. Revista d'Estudis Autonòmics i Federals, 27(June): 80-116. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2436/20.8080.01.26
Vall-Prat, P. & Rodon, T. (2017) Decentralization and Regional Cabinet Size: the Spanish Case (1979-2015). West European Politics, 40(4): 717-740. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2016.1275422 [Original dataset]
Work in Progress
Democratization is Calling: The Political Consequences of Telephone Networks (with Francesc Amat). Draft
New communication technologies have important economic and political consequences. The availability of a new communication technology can become a weapon in hands of elites to obtain larger shares of political power ―either through coercion or mobilization but also a powerful resource for new challenger parties. In this paper we explore the political consequences of telephone network expansion in a semi-autocratic regime; we focus in Catalonia in the 1901-1923 period. We analyze the political consequences of a new public telephone network through a diff-in-diff identification strategy based on the timing and characteristics of telephones at the municipality-level. We also exploit distances to the existing private networks to exogeneize telephone extension and to test the robustness of our findings. Our main results show that new challenger parties directly benefited from the extension of telephone networks and reduced support rates for status quo elite parties. The heterogeneous effects of telephone extensions point out to a double dynamic of (i) elite replacement of status quo elites by new economic elites and (ii) voters' mobilization associated with telephone expansions among left-wing parties. Our findings contribute to better understanding the political consequences of new communication technologies in semi-autocratic contexts, where new political parties are as interested in advancing their position as to erode the influence capacity of entrenched status quo elites.
The turnout gender gap in periods of early democratization has been a matter of scholarly interest for years. In the wake of female enfranchisement, why is that women participated at lower rates in the elections than men? Against the backdrop of existing explanations, we suggest that being exposed to the functioning of elections can facilitate the closing of the gender turnout gap. Learning how elections work represents a political socialization experience that can counteract previous biases. Using the context of the Spanish Second Republic as a unique case-study (1931-1936), we test this argument by exploiting a lottery that assigned some citizens—men and women—to act as polling officers in 1933, the year in which women were first allowed to vote and serve as election officials. By building and exploiting a panel with individual-and contextual-level information, we show that women randomly selected in 1933 to act as polling officers were as likely to participate in the subsequent election than men. The analysis suggests that this mainly occurred because randomly selected women were more reactive to mobilization strategies by parties and trade unions. Our findings are important as they highlight the potential benefits of exposure to election engineering among groups less engaged with democracy.
Working Paper available under request
Intra-Elite Competition and Electoral Fraud.
Work in Progress
Work in Progress
Multilevel Affective Polarization (with Daniel Balinhas)
Work in Progress
Dissertations
Vall-Prat, P., 2016. The Politics of Decentralisation in Fiscal Rules Compliance: (Dis)Obeying Fiscal Rules in Spanish Regions [MSc Political Science and Political Economy, LSE] [Link]
Vall-Prat, P., 2015. Who Are the Most Active MPs? Determinants of MPs parliamentary activity. [Research Master in Political Science, UPF] [Link]
Vall-Prat, P., 2014. Regional Cabinet Size: autonomic cabinet size variation in Spain. http://hdl.handle.net/10230/22820 [BA Political Science and Public Administration, UPF] [Link]
Hodgepodge
Reports & Published Working Papers
New Productive Models Against COVID-19: Beyond the choice between saving the economy and saving lives. 2020 [Link]
Case study: The Closing of the Model Prison. 2018 [Link] [CATALAN]
Curto, F. & Pau Vall-Prat, 2016. 'Mesurar la governança: Anàlisi dels World Governance Indicators', EsadeGeo Working Paper 27. [link] [CATALAN]
Consultancy Projects
Anàlisi de l’organització i de les entitats membres en clau de governança. 2019 [Link] [CATALAN]
La provisió d'atenció integrada: una aproximació internacional comparada. 2016
Una proposta de criteris de governança per a una organització tributària moderna. 2014. [Link] [CATALAN]